Abstract. We introduce a variant of Dependence Logic in which truth is defined not in terms of existence of winning strategies for the Proponent (Eloise) in a semantic game, but in terms of lack of winning strategies for the Opponent (Abelard). We show that this language is a conservative but paraconsistent extension of First Order Logic, that its validity problem can be reduced to that of First Order Logic, that it capable of expressing its own truth and validity predicates, and that it is expressively equivalent to Universal Second Order Logic Π 1 1 . Furthermore, we prove that a Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic formula is consistent if and only if it is equivalent to some First Order Logic sentence; and we show that, on the other hand, all Paraconsistent Dependence Logic sentences are equivalent to some First Order sentence with respect to truth (but not necessarily with respect to falsity).
Introduction
Dialetheism is the philosophical position according to which there exist true contradictions. It has been proposed as a possible answer to the paradoxes of self-reference; and moreover, although this is of less relevance for the purposes of this work, it also is one potential approach to the logical treatment of vagueness and transition states. Even though dialetheism is not the only possible motivation for the study of paraconsistent logics, that is, logics in which the principle of explosion ("Ex contradictione quodlibet ": from a contradiction, everything can be
The author acknowledges the support of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (project number DI 561/6-1). 1 We refer to [2, 30, 29, 31] for a more in-depth discussion of this interesting area of research. derived) fails, it is easy to see that dialetheism plus the principle of explosion plus modus ponens implies triviality: if there are true contradictions, and any contradiction implies that everything is true, it follows at once that everything is true. This is a conclusion that appears to have some practical drawbacks, at least if one maintains that what matters in a logic is the notion of truth and/or logical consequence that it generates; and hence, it comes to little surprise that dialetheism has been generally associated with paraconsistent logics.
The purpose of the present work is to draw attention to a connection between logics of imperfect information, and in particular Dependence Logic, and dialetheism: more specifically, what we aim to show is that by making a simple modification to the semantics of Dependence Logic -in brief, by defining truth in terms of the absence of winning strategies for the Opponent in the semantic game, rather than in terms of the existence of winning strategies for the Proponent -we obtain a paraconsistent logic with truth gluts, that is, sentences that are both true and false. This logic is capable of expressing its own truth and validity predicates; and, differently from other logics for dialetheism such as the Logic of Paradox [28] , its definition requires no alterations to the definition of first order model or to the interpretations of first order sentences. Furthermore, as we will see, this logic has very natural properties: it is expressively equivalent to Universal Second Order Logic Π 1 1 , and therefore the problem of finding its valid formulas is no harder than in the first order case, and moreover a sentence of this logic is consistent over all models if and only if it is equivalent to some first order sentence -in other words, the consistent kernel of our logic is precisely First Order Logic.
This strongly suggests that the formalism which we will develop in this work -and for whose semantics we will give a justification which is entirely independent from issues of self-reference or paraconsistency -is, in a way, a natural extension of First Order Logic to a formalism capable of expressing its own truth predicate.
Games and Logics
In this section we will recall the basic definitions of Game Theoretic Semantics and of logics of imperfect information such as IF Logic and, most importantly for our purposes, Dependence Logic. Then we will discuss some of the main properties of Dependence Logic, setting the background for the variant of it which we will introduce and discuss in Section 3.
Game Theoretic Semantics
Game Theoretic Semantics [15, 17, 19] is an approach to semantics which is inspired to Wittgenstein's language games. In brief, Game Theoretic Semantics associates sentences to semantic games, which represent debates between a Proponent (called usually Eloise), who attempts to show that the sentence is true, and an Opponent (called usually Abelard), who attempts to show that the sentence is false; and then truth is defined in terms of the existence of winning strategies in these games.
In Subsection 2.4, we will show how to construct such games for an extension of First Order Logic; but informally speaking, the semantic games associated to first order sentences can be defined as follows:
1. A first order atom R t or t 1 = t 2 corresponds to a basic assertion, that can be verified or falsified directly by the players: and the resulting game, in which Eloise argues that R t (or t 1 = t 2 ) is true in the model and Abelard argues the contrary, is won by Eloise if this statement holds in the model and by Abelard otherwise. 2. For Eloise to assert that ¬ψ means that she is willing to assert that her opponent Abelard could not argue convincingly that ψ is true. Hence, the semantic game for ¬ψ is just the game for ψ, but with the roles of the players swapped. 3. For Eloise to assert that ψ ∨ θ means that she is willing to assert that ψ holds or that θ holds. Hence, ψ ∨ θ corresponds to the game in which Eloise chooses between ψ and θ, and then plays the corresponding game. 4. For Eloise to assert that ∃vψ means that she is willing to assert that This is all that there is in the definition of the semantic games for first order expressions. These rules are entirely natural, and, one might argue, at least as straightforward as the rules of Tarski's semantics. Truth and falsity are then defined in terms of the existence of winning strategies for the players:
Definition 2.1. For any model M and first order sentence φ, we say that φ is game-theoretically true in M and we write M |= + G φ if and only if Eloise has a winning strategy in the game corresponding to φ in M ; and we say that it is game-theoretically false, and we write M |= − G φ, if and only if Abelard has a winning strategy in this game. Now, since these games are of finite length, of perfect information (in the sense that at every stage of the game the players know everything about the history of the game) and zero-sum, it follows from Zermelo's Theorem that any such game is determined, that is, at least one of the players has a winning strategy. Hence, we have that the Game Theoretic Semantics satisfies the Law of the Excluded Middle: 
Suppose that Eloise has a winning strategy for the game corresponding to φ. Then she has a winning strategy for the game corresponding to φ ∨ ¬φ: she simply picks the left disjunct, then plays as in her winning strategy for this subgame.
Suppose instead that Eloise has no winning strategies for φ. Then Abelard has a winning strategy for φ: and since ¬φ corresponds to the game for φ, but with the roles of the players swapped, it follows at once that Eloise has a winning strategy for ¬φ. Then she also has a winning strategy for φ ∨ ¬φ, in which she picks the right disjunct and then plays her winning strategy for this subgame.
Also, since swapping the players twice is the same as keeping them unvaried, it is easy to see that the law of double negation holds for this semantics:
Furthermore, no terminal position of our games is winning for Abelard and for Eloise both: as Avicenna, who famously stated that anyone who denies the law of non-contradiction should be beaten and burned until he admits that to be beaten is not the same as not to be beaten, and to be burned is not the same as not to be burned would perhaps be glad to see, no reconciliation is possible, even in principle, between somebody who asserts that an atomic formula BEATEN(x) is true and somebody who asserts that it is false. And since all possible debates between Eloise and Abelard end in terminal positions of this kind, we have that Proof. By the law of double negation, we know that M |= + G ¬¬(¬φ ∨ ¬¬φ) if and only if M |= + G ¬φ ∨ ¬¬φ. But this is an instance of the law of the excluded middle, which we already proved.
It is worth remarking here that the proof of Proposition 2.6 makes no use whatsoever of Proposition 2.5, nor vice versa. In effect, the two propositions are not related: 2.5 says that it is never the case for any semantic game that Abelard and Eloise both have a winning strategy, whereas 2.6 says that Eloise has a winning strategy for all semantic games of a certain kind. In the case of First Order Logic, these two statements turn out to be both true; but as we will see in Subsection 2.6, there is a known conservative extension of this logic for which 2.6 fails and 2.5 holds, and in Section 3 we will develop one for which the opposite is the case.
So far so good. But an obvious question to ask at this point is: what exactly is the relationship between Game Theoretic Semantics and Tarski's Compositional Semantics? As the following result, with which we end this subsection, shows, these two semantics are not in competition with each other: rather, they express precisely the same truth and satisfaction conditions, albeit with different justifications! Proof. The proof is by structural induction on ψ and poses no difficulties.
Hence, any argument that can be used for justifying the acceptability of Game Theoretic Semantics for First Order Logic can also be used to justify the acceptability of Tarski's Semantics, and vice versa. These two semantics are simply different ways of generating the same notion of truth: choosing to rely on one or on the other is at most a matter of mere convenience or of preference.
However, as we will see in the next subsections, things change once we start considering certain variants and extensions of First Order Logic.
Logics of Imperfect Information
One aspect of First Order Logic which accounts for much of its expressive power is the fact that this formalism permits nested quantification, and, in particular, alternation between existential and universal quantifiers. Through this device, it is possible to specify complex patterns of dependence and independence between variables: for example, in the sentence ∀x∃y∀z∃wR(x, y, z, w), (2.1) the existential variable w is a function of both x and z, whereas the existential variable y is a function of x alone. As Skolem's normal form for (2.1) illustrates, nested quantification can be understood as a restricted form of second-order existential quantification: indeed, the above sentence can be seen to be equivalent to
In First Order Logic, the notion of quantifier dependence or independence is intrinsically tied to the notion of scope: an existential quantifier ∃y depends on an universal quantifier ∀x if and only if the former is in the scope of the latter. As observed by Henkin in [14] , these patterns can be made more general. In particular, one may consider branching quantifier expressions of the form  
where each Q ij is ∃ or ∀ and all x ij are distinct. The intended interpretation of such an expression is that each x ij may depend on all x ij ′ for j ′ < j, but not on any x i ′ j ′ for i ′ = i: for example, in the sentence ∀x ∃y ∀z ∃w R(x, y, z, w) (2.4) the variable y depends on x but not on z, and the variable w depends on z but not on x, and hence the corresponding Skolem expression is As proved by Enderton and Walkoe in [6] and [35] , the answer is not restricted at all ! Branching Quantifier Logic is precisely as expressive as Existential Second Order Logic (Σ 1 1 ). Hence, Branching Quantifier Logic can be understood as an alternative approach to the study of Σ 1 1 , of its fragments and of its extensions; and indeed, much of the research done on the subject can be seen as an attempt to study Σ 1 1 through the lens of these variants of first-order logic.
Independence Friendly Logic [18, 16, 27] , also called IF Logic, can be thought of as a linearization of Branching Quantifier Logic: rather than dealing the unwieldy quantifier matrices of (2.3), Hintikka and Sandu introduced slashed quantifiers ∃v/V with the intended interpretation of "there exists a v, chosen independently from the variables in V ". For example, the sentence (2.4) can be translated in IF Logic as
This -at first sight entirely unproblematic -modification led to a number of important innovations on the semantic side. Game-theoretical explanations for the semantics of branching quantifiers predate the development of IF Logic; but it is with IF Logic that the Game Theoretic Semantics for First Order Logic was extended and adapted to a logic of imperfect information in a formal way. In Subsection 2.4, we will present in some detail a successor of the Game Theoretic Semantics for IF Logic; but in brief, in the Game Theoretic Semantics for IF Logic, slashed quantifiers correspond to imperfect information moves in which the corresponding player has to select a value for the quantified variable without having access to the values of the slashed variables.
Dependence Logic [32, 34] , which we will start discussing in the next subsection, is another variant of First Order Logic which adds to it the possibility of expressing more patterns of dependence and independence between variables. Rather than doing so by adding new forms of quantification, as we will see, Dependence Logic isolates the notion of dependence in some new dependence atoms: this approach -which, as discussed in [32] , is equivalent to the one of IF Logic, in the sense that any IF Logic sentence is equivalent to a Dependence Logic sentence and vice versa -proved itself most fruitful, and sparked the development of a number of technical results about the properties of this formalism and its extensions and variants. 
Dependence Logic: Syntax
Dependence Logic is a conservative extension of First Order Logic which adds to it dependence atoms = ( t 1 , t 2 ), with the intended interpretation of "the value of t 2 is a function of the value of t 1 ":
4 for example, Equations (2.4) and (2.6) would be translated in Dependence Logic as
where the fact that the choice of w may depend only on z is represented by =(z, w).
More formally, the syntax of Dependence Logic can be given as follows:
Definition 2.8 (Syntax). Let Σ be a first order signature. Then the set of all Dependence Logic formulas over Σ is given by
where R ranges over all relation symbols in Σ, t ranges over all tuples of terms of signature Σ and of the required arities, t 1 and t 2 range over terms, t 1 and t 2 range over all tuples of terms and v ranges over all variables.
As usual, we will write t 1 = t 2 as a shorthand for ¬(t 1 = t 2 ), ψ ∧ θ as a shorthand for ¬((¬ψ) ∨ (¬θ)) and ∀vψ as a shorthand for ¬(∃v(¬ψ)). Definition 2.9 (Free Variables and Sentences). Let ψ be a Dependence Logic formula over a signature Σ. Then the set Free(ψ) of the free variables of ψ is defined inductively as follows:
1. For all atomic formulas R t, Free(R t) is the set of all variables occurring in t; 2. Free(t 1 = t 2 ) is the set of all variables occurring in t 1 and t 2 ; 3. Free(=( t 1 , t 2 )) is the set of all variables occurring in t 1 and t 2 ;
A formula ψ is said to be a sentence if Free(ψ) = ∅.
Dependence Logic: Game Theoretic Semantics
In this section, we will briefly recall the game theoretic semantics for Dependence Logic. Our treatment will be entirely similar to the one of [32] , and we refer to it for a more detailed exposition.
As in the case of the Game Theoretic Semantics of First Order Logic, our games will involve two players, the existential one (called Eloise) who attempts to demonstrate the truth of a sentence in a model, and the universal one (called Abelard) who attempts to demonstrate its falsity. However, differently from the case of First Order Logic, our games will be games of imperfect information: Definition 2.10 (Semantic Games). Let M be a first order model and let φ be a Dependence Logic sentence over the signature of M . Then the semantic game G M (φ) is defined as follows:
• Positions are triples (ψ, s, α), where ψ is an instance 5 of a subformula of φ, s is a variable assignment and α ∈ {Eloise, Abelard}; The definitions of strategy and play can be given as usual, and we will not report them here. For the sake of generality we will admit nondeterministic strategies, which allow for the selection of multiple possible successors of a given position. 6 However, in order to represent the intended meaning of dependence atoms we need the following notion of uniform strategy: Definition 2.11. A strategy σ for Player α ∈ {Abelard, Eloise} is uniform if for any two plays p 1 , p 2 in which Player α follows σ and which end with (=( t 1 , t 2 ), s, α) and (=( t 1 , t 2 ), s ′ , α) respectively, for the same instance of the dependence atom,
The rationale behind this condition should be clear: a strategy for α is uniform if and only if when Player α follows it and reaches a dependence atom =( t 1 , t 2 ), he or she can guarantee that the value of t 2 will be a function of the value of t 1 .
Truth and falsity are then defined in terms of the existence of uniform winning strategies: Definition 2.12. For any sentence φ and model M , we say that φ is true in M , and we write M |= + φ, if and only if Eloise has a uniform winning strategy in
Similarly, φ is false in M if and only if Abelard has a uniform winning strategy in G M (φ); and in that case, we write M |= − φ.
The following result then follows at once from the definition of the game theoretic semantics: Proof. Suppose that M |= + φ, that is, that Eloise has a uniform winning strategy in
, except for the fact that the first move of this game exchanges the roles of the two players; and therefore, Abelard has a uniform winning strategy in this game, and hence M |= − ¬φ. The other direction and the second biimplication are verified similarly.
The fact that we are placing restrictions on which strategies we allow accounts for the possible existence of truth gaps. For example, consider the sentence ∀x∃y(=(∅, x) ∧ x = y). With respect to a model M with domain {0, 1}, the semantic game corresponds to the matching pennies game:
1. First, Abelard selects an element m 1 ∈ {0, 1}; 2. Then, Eloise selects another element m 2 ∈ {0, 1}, independently on Abelard's choice: 3. Then the game ends. If m 1 = m 2 , Eloise wins; otherwise, Abelard wins. Clearly, neither player has a winning strategy for this game: no matter what value Abelard picks, he cannot make it impossible for Eloise to select the same value, but on the other hand since Eloise is not allowed to spy Abelard's choice she will not be able to guarantee that she will copy Abelard's selection.
Dependence Logic: Team Semantics
The game theoretic semantics which we described in the previous section is a simple generalization of the one of First Order Logic. However, as we know, First Order Logic can also be given the equivalent, compositional Tarski Semantics, in which open formulas correspond to satisfaction conditions over variable assignments. Is there any way to extend Tarski's Semantics to the case of Dependence Logic?
As [3] shows by means of a combinatorial argument, the answer is negative, as there exist models with more non-interchangeable Dependence Logic 8 formulas with one free variable than sets of elements.
9 However, not all is lost: in [20] , Hodges developed a compositional semantics for Independence Friendly Logic, which we will call "Team Semantics" after [32] , and whose Dependence Logic variant (also from [32] ) we will now describe.
The fundamental intuition behind Team Semantics is to take in consideration teams, that is, sets of assignments, and to generalize semantic games to initial assignments picked randomly from a team: Definition 2.14 (Team). Let M be a first order model, and let V be a set of variables. A team over M with domain V is a set X of variable assignments over M with domain V . If Eloise has a uniform winning strategy in G M X (ψ), we say that the team X satisfies positively (or just "satisfies") ψ in M and we write (M, X) |= + ψ; and similarly, if Abelard has a uniform winning strategy in G M X (ψ) we say that X satisfies negatively ψ in M and we write (M, X) |= − ψ.
Clearly, we have that for all models M and sentences φ, M |= ± φ if and only if (M, {∅}) |= ± φ.
10
8 Cameron and Hodges' proof refers to IF Logic instead; but their argument can be adapted with no difficulty to the case of Dependence Logic. 9 The proof does not generalize to infinite models; however, [8] extends this result to this further case by introducing a notion of sensible semantics. 10 Some care must be paid to distinguish the team {∅}, which contains the empty assignment, from the empty team ∅. As we said, if φ is a sentence then M |= + φ if and only if (M, {∅}) |= + φ; but on the other hand, as we will see, (M, ∅) |= ± φ for all φ.
The advantage is that this satisfaction definition is compositional: 
Proof. The proof is by structural induction on the formulas and poses no particular difficulties. We refer the interested reader to [20, 32] .
It is now easy to find the rules corresponding to our derived connectives and operators: Corollary 2.17.
and only if there exists a function
We conclude this subsection by observing that there is a clear asymmetry between the positive and negative conditions for dependence atoms: an atom =( t 1 , t 2 ) is true in a team X if and only if the atom satisfies the corresponding dependence condition, whereas it is false if and only if X = ∅. This is a direct consequence of the definition of truth in terms of existence of winning strategies: in brief, while a restriction on the information available to a player can affect the existence or non-existence of winning strategies for her, it has no such effect on the potential existence of winning strategies for the other player -after all, the first player might well "get lucky" and select the best response even in the absence of sufficient information.
Some Known Results
In this subsection, we will recall some of the properties of Dependence Logic. Except where stated otherwise, all results are from [32] .
Theorem 2.18 (Locality). For all formulas ψ of Dependence Logic, all models
M and all teams X 1 and X 2 whose restrictions to Free(φ) coincide, Therefore, a first order formula holds in a team only if it holds in all of its assignments, and it fails in it only if it fails for all of its assignments. This clarifies the reason for the presence of truth value gaps in this semantics: if a team contains assignments which satisfy a formula and assignments which do not satisfy it, then the formula is neither true nor false with respect to it. Hence, with respect to first order formulas, Team Semantics can be thought of as a form of supervaluationism.
Furthermore, we have as an easy corollary of this result that However, in general the connectives of Dependence Logic behave rather differently from those of First Order Logic. In particular, disjunction is not idempotent: indeed, consider any model M with two elements 0 and 1 and the team X = {(x := 0), (x := 1)}. Then we have that (M, X) |= + =(∅, x)∨ = (∅, x), since X can be split into two subteams X 1 = {(x := 0)} and X 2 = {(x := 1)} with respect to which x is constant; but on the other hand, x is not constant in X, and therefore (M, X) |= + =(∅, x). As a consequence of this fact, the law of non-contradiction does not hold in Dependence Logic, strictly speaking: for any formula φ, (M, ∅) |= + φ ∧ ¬φ. Hence, Dependence Logic displays a (very weak) form of paraconsistency.
However, this following variant of non-contradiction holds:
In particular, this implies that for any sentence φ, it is never the case that M |= + φ and M |= − φ: no sentence is both true and false (although, as we saw, there exist sentences which are neither).
Note, however, that ¬(φ ∧ ¬φ) is not, in general, valid. For example, let M contain at least two elements and take φ = ∀x∃y(=(∅, y) ∧ x = y): as we saw, neither player has a winning strategy for G M (φ), and it follows easily that the same holds for G M (¬(φ ∧ ¬φ)). The same choice of φ, as an aside, also shows that φ ∨ ¬φ is not a theorem of Dependence Logic; but due to the fact that Dependence Logic admits truth gaps, this is less surprising.
What is, instead, highly surprising is the following result from [24] , which shows that the negation of Dependence Logic -which coincides to the usual contradictory negation over first order sentences -behaves, in general, very differently indeed from the contradictory negation: 
for all models M whose signature contains the ones of ψ 1 and ψ 2 and for all X with domain containing Free(ψ 1 ) ∪ Free(ψ 2 ). 
for all models M and teams X and for
Furthermore, R occurs only negatively in Φ(R). 
for all models M and teams X.
Another one of the most interesting properties of Dependence Logic, whose proof can be found in §6.4 of [32] 
where φ represents a Gödel numbering for φ.
The fact that the law of the excluded middle fails for Dependence Logic makes this formalism quite safe from the Liar Paradox. It is certainly possible to find a sentence λ of Dependence Logic such that
however, this expression λ will simply not be true in any model of Peano's Axioms, and therefore neither will τ ( λ ) or its negation. What about validity? Due to the equivalence between Dependence Logic and Existential Second Order Logic, the validity problem for Dependence Logic is highly undecidable: Many important set-theoretic statements belong in this class, and therefore correspond to Dependence Logic sentences: for example, one can find a Dependence Logic sentence which is valid if and only if there are no inaccessible cardinals (see Exercise 7.9 of [32])! As a consequence, there is no hope whatsoever of finding a semidecidable, sound and complete proof system for Dependence Logic. However, [25] describes a sound and complete Natural Deduction system for finding the first order consequences of a Dependence Logic expression; and [12] introduces a sound and complete axiom system for an extension of Dependence Logic, but with respect to a weaker semantics, analogous to Henkin's general semantics for Second Order Logic.
We barely scratched the surface of the current body of knowledge about Dependence Logic here, of course. But these few results are perhaps sufficient to point out some of the characteristics of this formalism, and will provide an useful basis of comparison for the paraconsistent version of it that we will develop in the next section.
Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic
In this section, we will introduce a novel, simple, paraconsistent variant of Dependence Logic. As we will see, many of the known results about Dependence Logic can be transferred to this new formalism with no difficulty whatsoever; and furthermore, as we will see, Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic will be able to express not only its truth predicate, but also its validity predicate!
Paraconsistent Team Semantics
As we saw, the Game Theoretic Semantics of Dependence Logic is a variant of that of First Order Logic in which a a player can only employ strategies which respect certain uniformity conditions, specified in terms of dependence atoms. Then, as in the first order case, one characterizes the truth or falsity of Dependence Logic sentences in terms of the existence of uniform winning strategies for the existential or the universal players.
However, one might wonder if this is condition is not too strict. If the semantic games represent debates between agents about the truth of a sentence, and if, as we saw, there exist some possible debates in which neither agent can guarantee a victory, perhaps one might want to be more permissive and say that a sentence is true if one's opponent cannot reliably succeed in falsifying it? This idea would correspond to the following truth definition: In particular, given a sentence φ, we say that φ is paraconsistently true in M , and we write M |= + P φ, if and only if (M, {∅}) |= + P φ; and we say that it is paraconsistently false, and we write M |= − P φ, if and only if (M, {∅}) |= − P φ. If our semantic games were determined, as the ones of First Order Logic are, this definition would be obviously equivalent to the usual one: indeed, if one of the players of a determined two-player game has no winning strategy, it follows at once that the other does. However, this is not the case for our games. For example, consider again the sentence φ = ∀x∃y(=(∅, y) ∧ x = y). As we saw, if M has at least two elements then neither player has a winning strategy G M (φ); and hence, we have at once that M |= + P φ and M |= − P φ. In other words, our φ is a simple example of a sentence which is both true and false! More in general, it is easy to see that for all M , X and ψ,
This implies at once that the resulting formalism, which we will call "Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic" is contained in Team Logic, that is, in the extension of Dependence Logic which adds a contradictory negation to it [33] . Furthermore, this property makes it trivial to find the Team Semantics rules for this logic Thus, we will define =( t 1 , t 2 ) as the formula ¬ =( t 1 , t 2 ) and we will think of it as a non-dependence atom. Obviously, the satisfaction conditions this atom are obtained by switching the + and − signs in those of the dependence atom: in other words, they will hold positively in a team X if and only if t 2 is not a function of t 1 in X, and it will hold negatively in it only if X = ∅.
Properties
Most of the properties of Dependence Logic are in natural correspondence with properties of Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic. To begin with, it is clear that locality (in the sense of Theorem 2.18) holds for Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic too; and furthermore, This is indeed a peculiar situation. Dependence Logic, which admits truth gaps, does not satisfy either the Law of Excluded Middle φ ∨ ¬φ nor the Law of Non-Contradiction ¬(φ∧¬φ); and Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic, which admits truth gluts, satisfies both! The key for understanding this, of course, is to notice that the semantic games for Paraconsistent Nondependence Logic formulas are not determined and, hence, our semantics for the negation in terms of player swapping -while being completely natural from a game-theoretic perspective -does not correspond to the contradictory negation: in general, asserting ¬φ in Dependence Logic or in Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic is not at all the same as rejecting φ, although it reduces to it in the case of first order expressions.
Just 
Proof. This can be proved very easily by means of Theorem 2.21, or, alternatively, by induction on ψ. However, we will show yet another proof, which uses the game-theoretic definition of truth and falsity in Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic. Suppose that Player α ∈ {Abelard, Eloise} has no uniform winning strategy in G M X (ψ). Then, since X ⊆ Y he or she also has no uniform winning strategy in G M Y (ψ): indeed, if a uniform strategy won this game for ψ starting from all initial assignments in Y , he or she could also win starting from all assignments in X ⊆ Y .
Similarly, we have that Proof. Let ψ 1 and ψ 2 be as in our hypothesis, and consider θ 1 = ¬ψ 1 and θ 2 = ¬ψ 2 . Now, suppose that (M, X) |= + θ 1 and (M, X) |= + θ 2 : then (M, X) |= Proof. Let Φ(R) be a Π 1 1 sentence as in our hypothesis. Then ¬Φ(R) is equivalent to some Σ 1 1 sentence in which R occurs only negatively; and therefore, by Theorem 2.27, there exists a Dependence Logic formula θ such that
as required.
So far so good: Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic is so tightly coupled with Dependence Logic that importing even sophisticated Dependence Logic results into it is quite unproblematic.
Is Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic capable of expressing its own truth predicate, like Dependence Logic is? As we will now see, the answer is positive, and furthermore this truth predicate is a simple variant of the truth predicate for Dependence Logic: Proof. Let τ * be the truth predicate for Dependence Logic of Theorem 2.28, such that
for all φ. Furthermore, let Neg(x) be a term such that Neg( φ ) = ¬φ ; and finally, define τ (x) = ¬τ (Neg(x)). Then for all models M ω of Peano's Axioms with signature Σ,
Once again, a difficult and important result for Dependence Logic can be transferred to Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic with very little trouble! The answer that Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic gives to the Liar Paradox is, of course, the dialetheist one. It is possible to find an expression λ such that M ω |= + τ (λ) if and only if M ω |= − λ for all models of Peano's Axioms M ω ; and for all such models, we will simply have that λ and τ (λ) are both true and false.
Hence, Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic is a paraconsistent, conservative extension of First Order Logic that can express its own truth predicate!
Validity in Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic
In this section, we will examine the following concept of validity in Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic: It is easy to see that differently from the case of Dependence Logic, validity in Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic is semidecidable and reducible to validity in First Order Logic. This follows at once by the equivalence between Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic and Π 1 1 : every Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic sentence is logically equivalent to (and effectively translatable into) some sentence of the form ∀ XΨ( X), where Ψ is first order, and hence it is valid if and only if Ψ( R) is valid for some new tuple of relation symbols R.
What about a proof system for this formalism? Once again, known results from Dependence Logic come to our succor: in particular, we can reduce the problem of finding valid Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic sentences to the problem of finding contradictory Dependence Logic sentences, which can be solved using Kontinen and Väänänen's proof system! Hence, in order to check whether a sentence φ is P-valid, it suffices to check whether ¬φ entails ⊥ with respect to the proof system of [25] .
Finally, let us check that Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic can define its own validity predicate too. The main ingredient of the proof will be the following lemma: We will not show the proof of this lemma here, but it poses no real difficulties: in brief, we encode its axioms and rules of the axiom system for Dependence Logic of [25] in the definition of π Σ in such a way that (p, φ ) ∈ P if and only if p represents a proof of ¬φ ⊢ ⊥. Note that π Σ only needs to be a first-order sentence: informally speaking, this corresponds to the known fact that the problem of the validity of Π 
By the previous lemma we know that φ is valid if and only if whenever M ω satisfies Peano's Axioms, Now let c be a new constant symbol, and consider the expression ρ(c) = ∀P (π Σ → ∃p(P pc)). Since this is a sentence in Π 1 1 , there exists a Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic sentence ρ(c) which is equivalent to it. Then ρ(x) is the formula that we were searching: indeed,
Again, the fact that Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic admits truth gluts deals easily with the resulting paradox of self-reference. It is possible to find a sentence ν that is valid if and only if ¬ρ( ν ) is valid and, therefore, if and only if ¬ν is valid; but this is not a problem, as then we simply have that ν and ¬ν are both valid.
Consistent Sentences in Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic
In this subsection, we will attempt to to characterize the sentences of Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic which are consistent, in the sense given by the following definition: We now have all that we need to prove our main result for this subsection: 
Generalized Dependencies in Paraconsistent Team Semantics
Even though functional dependency was the first dependency notion which was studied in the context of Team Semantics, it was by no means the only one. Many other notions of dependence or independence atoms have been studied in this context, such as for example the independence atoms [13] TS-ind. (M, X) |= + t 1 ⊥ t 2 if and only if X( t 1 t 2 ) = X( t 1 ) × X( t 2 ), the inclusion and exclusion atoms [9] TS-inc. (M, X) |= + t 1 ⊆ t 2 if and only if X( t 1 ) ⊆ X( t 2 ), TS-exc. (M, X) |= + t 1 | t 2 if and only if X( t 1 ) ∩ X( t 2 ) = ∅, or the multivalued dependence atoms [7] TS-mdep. (M, X) |= + x ։ y if and only if for every s, s ′ ∈ X with s( x) = s ′ ( x) there exists a s ′′ ∈ X such that s ′′ ( x y) = s( x y) and s ′′ (z) = s ′ (z) for all variables z ∈ Dom(X)\{ x y};
and the study of the resulting logics and their relationship (in particular, of the definability relations between such dependency notions) is a currently very active area of research. As always, there is little trouble transferring the resulting findings from the case of team semantics to the case of paraconsistent team semantics; for instance, since we know from [9] that all nonempty NP properties of teams correspond to the satisfaction conditions of formulas of Independence Logic (that is, of First Order Logic with team semantics plus independence atoms), it follows at once that all co-NP properties of teams correspond to satisfaction conditions of formulas for the paraconsistent dual of this logic.
In this section, we will focus on the case of Paraconsistent Dependence Logic, that is, the logic obtained by adding directly the functional dependency atom = ( t 1 , t 2 ) of Team Semantics to the Paraconsistent Team Semantics rather than transforming it into its dual = ( t 1 , t 2 ). As we will see, every sentence of Paraconsistent Dependence Logic is logically equivalent to some sentence of First Order Logic.
Thus, functional dependence atoms -or, as we will see, any other firstorder, downwards-closed dependency conditions -do not increase the expressive power of First Order Logic with Paraconsistent Team Semantics. It is important, however, to keep in mind that this result applies to sentences and not to formulas: indeed, it is easy to see that the functional dependence atom =(∅, x) is not logically equivalent (in Paraconsistent Team Semantics) to any formula of Paraconsistent Dependence Logic (and, in particular, to any first order formula), since it is not upwards closed in the sense of Theorem 3.5. Nonetheless, any sentence which uses such an atom can be converted into one which does not use it.
Let us begin with some definitions: Even if D is a first order dependency, there is in general no guarantee that FO(D) and PFO(D) are no more expressive than First Order Logic. For instance, all the non-dependency atoms = ( t 1 , t 2 ) are first order, for D * = ∃ x y 1 y 2 (P x y 1 ∧ P x y 2 ∧ y 1 = y 2 ); and, as we saw, all Π 1 1 properties are expressible in terms of such dependencies (and of the language of First Order Logic, interpreted according to Paraconsistent Team Semantics). The same can be said about functional dependency atoms in team semantics. 13 For simplicity's sake, we limit ourselves to assigning non-trivial conditions to positive satisfiability. However, there are no great difficulties in generalizing this approach to the case in which nontrivial positive and negative satisfaction conditions. The reason why a negated dependence atom is assumed to be true only in the empty set in the case of Team Semantics and to be true in all teams except the empty set in the case of Paraconsistent Team Semantics is that we want to maintain the correspondence between team semantics and game-theoretic semantics insofar as it is possible, and either player has -trivially -a winning strategy for all games starting from the empty set of winning strategies.
Definition 4.2 (Downwards and Upwards Closed Dependencies).
A dependency D is said to be downwards closed if and only if
for all models (A, S) over the signature {P }. Similarly, D is said to be upwards closed if and only if
We will make use of the following result, from [11] : Proof. It suffices to observe that all such atoms are first order and upwards closed.
Another ingredient of our proof will be the following observation: 
Proof. Let φ * be the formula obtained from ¬φ by replacing all dependence atoms = ( t 1 , t 2 ) with negations of the the corresponding non-dependence atoms ¬ =( t 1 , t 2 ). We show, by induction on φ, that φ * works as required:
• For all first-order atoms R t, (M, X) |= Putting everything together, we obtain at once that This result, of course, can be extended with ease to all other first-order downwards-closed dependencies by observing that the negations of these dependencies are first-order upwards-closed dependencies (and, hence, safe to add to Team Semantics).
The situation in Paraconsistent Team Semantics is, once again, the dual of that of Team Semantics: even though non-dependence atoms bring the expressive power of our formalism far beyond that of First Order Logic (for instance, there exists a Π 1 1 -sentence -and, therefore, a Paraconsistent Nondependence Logic sentence -which is true in a model if and only if this model is finite), dependence atoms do not do so. This suggests the possibility that, perhaps, Paraconsistent Team Semantics may prove itself a less computationally demanding, but equally natural, framework than standard Team Semantics for the study of dependency notions in an abstract setting; but further work will be necessary in order to investigate the possibilities and the limitations of this approach.
Conclusion
As we saw, Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic (that is, the variant of Dependence Logic in which the truth of a sentence is not defined in terms of existence of winning strategies of the Proponent Eloise, but in terms of the lack of winning strategies for the Opponent Abelard) is a paraconsistent, conservative extension of First Order Logic that is capable of expressing its own truth and validity predicates. Furthermore, finding whether a sentence of this formalism is valid is no harder than finding whether a first order formula is valid; and the consistent fragment of this logic is equivalent precisely to First Order Logic. Just as Dependence Logic itself, Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic admits both a game theoretic semantics and a compositional Team Semantics, and can be thought of as a fragment of Team Logic [33] ; and furthermore, it is expressively equivalent to Universal Second Order Logic Π 1 1 . On the other hand, Paraconsistent Dependence Logic is no more expressive than First Order Logic insofar as definability of classes of models is considered.
Ultimately, the reason for our formalism's paraconsistency -and the reason why it is capable of expressing its own truth and validity predicateslies in its interpretation of negation, which is inherently game-theoretical: to negate a sentence is not to dismiss the possibility that it is true, but rather it is to admit one's incapability of forcing an opponent to admit its truth. The author dares not make any claims about this being the "right" notion of negation in some absolute sense: but, nonetheless, it seems to be a semantical operation which is worth investigating further.
Similarly, we most assuredly make no claim that Paraconsistent Nondependence Logic is the "One True Paraconsistent Logic". It is a formalism that has a natural definition and elegant theoretical properties, and its notion of "truth as lack of guarantee of falsifiability" appears to have some epistemological interest; but whether a logic is or is not appropriate depends very much on what we want to use it for. The purpose that led to the development of Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic was to find a game-theoretically motivated, paraconsistent, conservative extension of First Order Logic which is able to express its own truth predicate; and, through this, to point out a possible connection between Game Theoretic Semantics, Dependence Logic and paraconsistency. Further research may be useful in order to unveil the possibilities of this connection: in particular, as we saw, much of the work of recent years about generalized dependency notions in team semantics and their definability relations (see for instance [13, 9, 11] ) can be adapted to the setting of Paraconsistent Team Semantics with little to no difficulty, and it provides ample opportunities to study logics obtained by adding "dependencies" corresponding to further epistemic properties of teams (interpreted as sets of possible states). Furthermore, even though the proof system of [25] can be used for finding valid formulas of Paraconsistent Non-Dependence Logic, it would be interesting to develop directly a proof system for this logic (or variants thereof).
One question that we leave entirely open is the connection between Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic and other known paraconsistent logics: in particular, due to some conceptual similarity between the formalisms, we conjecture that a close relationship exists between Paraconsistent Nondependence Logic and Jaśkowski's Discussive Logic [21, 4] .
In any case, Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic appears to be an intriguing conservative extension of First Order Logic which adds to it the ability of expressing its own truth predicate; and it is the hope of the author that the results of this paper may contribute to a more vigorous exchange of ideas between the Paraconsistent Logic and the Dependence Logic research communities.
